How LaLiga and the Premier League split their TV money

In short: Spain wrote the inequality limit into law. Article 5 of Royal Decree-Law 5/2015 says the gap between the highest and lowest earning club may not exceed 3.5 times. England has no equivalent statute, leaves it to the clubs, and in 2024/25 landed at 1.6 times. The country with the legal cap is roughly twice as unequal as the country without one.

Broadcasting money is the largest single revenue line for almost every club in Europe, and how a league divides it does more to shape competitive balance than any spending rule. Two leagues that look similar on paper produce very different outcomes.

Spain: the formula is in the statute

Until 2015, Spanish clubs sold their television rights individually. Real Madrid and Barcelona negotiated their own contracts and took what the market would bear, which is how Spanish football arrived at one of the most lopsided revenue distributions in Europe.

Royal Decree-Law 5/2015 ended that. It made joint selling compulsory and, unusually, wrote the division of the proceeds into law rather than leaving it to the league. Article 5.3 sets the formula for the first division:

• 50% distributed equally among all twenty clubs
• 25% by sporting results, weighted across the five preceding seasons
• 25% by social implantation — of which one third comes from ticket revenue and average gate over five seasons, and two thirds from the club’s contribution to television audience

And Article 5.5 adds a ceiling. In the law’s own words, the difference between the clubs earning the most and the least “no podrá ser superior a 4,5 veces” — may not exceed 4.5 times — falling to a maximum of 3.5 times once total revenue passes €1.5 billion.

That is a striking thing for a parliament to legislate. Spain decided competitive balance was a matter of public policy, not a matter for the clubs.

What it actually produces

In the 2024/25 distribution, LaLiga divided €1,432 million across both professional divisions, of which €1,292 million went to the first division.

Club	2024/25
Real Madrid	€157.92m
FC Barcelona	€156.45m
Atlético de Madrid	€108.17m
Athletic Club	€72.26m
Real Sociedad	€67.80m
Real Betis	€64.67m
Sevilla FC	€63.95m

Three clubs take roughly 35% of the first-division pot — more than €420 million of €1,292 million between them.

The law does its job in one narrow sense: because Real Madrid received €157.92m and the cap is 3.5 times, no club can have received less than about €45m. The floor exists. But a floor at €45m against a ceiling at €158m is still a gap of well over €100 million a season, and that gap is legal by design.

England: no statute, narrower spread

The Premier League has no equivalent law. Distribution is a matter for the clubs, agreed among themselves, and it splits into three parts: an equal share, merit payments by final position, and facility fees based on how often a club is televised domestically.

In 2024/25 every club received an equal share of about £96.9 million — roughly £29.8m from domestic rights, £59.2m from international rights and £7.9m from central commercial revenue. On top of that came merit payments on a sliding scale of about £2.7m per position, and facility fees ranging from £8.9m for Ipswich Town, televised ten times, to £24.9m for Liverpool, televised thirty.

The result:

	2024/25 central payment
Liverpool (1st)	£174.9m
Southampton (20th)	£109.2m
Ratio	1.60x

The bottom club in England received an equal share alone — £96.9m — that is worth more than 89% of its total payment. In Spain the equal share is half the pot by law, but the other half is distributed in a way that reliably favours the same few clubs.

Why the stricter rule gives the wider gap

The paradox resolves once you look at what the Spanish formula actually rewards.

England’s variable half is merit and exposure within the current season. Finish higher, earn more; get televised more, earn more. Both reset every year, and both are things a club can change by playing well.

Spain’s variable half is results over five seasons and “social implantation” — season tickets, average attendance and contribution to television audience. Every one of those is a proxy for how large a club already is. A club with 80,000 seats and a global audience scores highly on social implantation because it has 80,000 seats and a global audience, not because of anything it did last season.

So the Spanish formula contains a component that is close to a direct payment for pre-existing size — the same structural feature we found inside UEFA’s value pillar, where €853 million of Champions League money is allocated on ten-year coefficient and market size.

The cap stops that component running away entirely. It does not stop it operating.

What this means for the spending rules

This matters more than it looks, because of how the spending limits work.

LaLiga’s squad cost limit is calculated from each club’s own forecast revenue. UEFA’s 70% squad cost ratio is a percentage of revenue. The Premier League’s 85% ratio is a percentage of revenue.

Every cost control in European football is a function of revenue. Broadcasting money is the largest component of that revenue for most clubs. So the distribution formula is not a separate question from the spending rules — it is the input to them. Deciding that one club receives €158m and another €45m is, in the same act, deciding that the first may spend three and a half times as much on players.

What comes next

Spain has already sold its next cycle. In 2025 LaLiga agreed domestic rights for 2027 to 2032 worth a reported €6,135 million — a substantial increase, and one that will push total revenue further above the €1.5 billion threshold at which the 3.5x cap binds.

A bigger pot narrows nothing on its own. If the formula stays as it is, a larger pot multiplied by the same percentages produces the same shape at a larger scale: the floor rises, the ceiling rises further, and the absolute gap widens even as the ratio holds.

The ratio is what the law limits. The gap in euros is what clubs actually spend.